OpenWrt – Rev 1
?pathlinks?
From d2e808b0dcca1b5e850274f770775c355ae36c48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Biwen Li <biwen.li@nxp.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 18:27:03 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 34/40] platfrom-security: support layerscape
This is an integrated patch of platform-security for
layerscape
Signed-off-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Biwen Li <biwen.li@nxp.com>
---
Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst | 67 ++
MAINTAINERS | 12 +
drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 8 +
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 2 +-
include/keys/secure-type.h | 33 +
security/keys/Kconfig | 11 +
security/keys/Makefile | 5 +
security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile | 2 +
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 13 +-
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h | 13 +
.../keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c | 37 ++
security/keys/secure_key.c | 339 ++++++++++
security/keys/securekey_desc.c | 608 ++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/securekey_desc.h | 141 ++++
14 files changed, 1288 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
create mode 100644 include/keys/secure-type.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/secure_key.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/securekey_desc.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/securekey_desc.h
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+==========
+Secure Key
+==========
+
+Secure key is the new type added to kernel key ring service.
+Secure key is a symmetric type key of minimum length 32 bytes
+and with maximum possible length to be 128 bytes. It is produced
+in kernel using the CAAM crypto engine. Userspace can only see
+the blob for the corresponding key. All the blobs are displayed
+or loaded in hex ascii.
+
+Secure key can be created on platforms which supports CAAM
+hardware block. Secure key can also be used as a master key to
+create the encrypted keys along with the existing key types in
+kernel.
+
+Secure key uses CAAM hardware to generate the key and blobify its
+content for userspace. Generated blobs are tied up with the hardware
+secret key stored in CAAM, hence the same blob will not be able to
+de-blobify with the different secret key on another machine.
+
+Usage::
+
+ keyctl add secure <name> "new <keylen>" <ring>
+ keyctl load secure <name> "load <hex_blob>" <ring>
+ keyctl print <key_id>
+
+"keyctl add secure" option will create the random data of the
+specified key len using CAAM and store it as a key in kernel.
+Key contents will be displayed as blobs to the user in hex ascii.
+User can input key len from 32 bytes to 128 bytes.
+
+"keyctl load secure" option will load the blob contents. In kernel,
+key will be deirved using input blob and CAAM, along with the secret
+key stored in CAAM.
+
+"keyctl print" will return the hex string of the blob corresponding to
+key_id. Returned blob will be of key_len + 48 bytes. Extra 48 bytes are
+the header bytes added by the CAAM.
+
+Example of secure key usage::
+
+1. Create the secure key with name kmk-master of length 32 bytes::
+
+ $ keyctl add secure kmk-master "new 32" @u
+ 46001928
+
+ $keyctl show
+ Session Keyring
+ 1030783626 --alswrv 0 65534 keyring: _uid_ses.0
+ 695927745 --alswrv 0 65534 \_ keyring: _uid.0
+ 46001928 --als-rv 0 0 \_ secure: kmk-master
+
+2. Print the blob contents for the kmk-master key::
+
+ $ keyctl print 46001928
+ d9743445b640f3d59c1670dddc0bc9c2
+ 34fc9aab7dd05c965e6120025012f029b
+ 07faa4776c4f6ed02899e35a135531e9a
+ 6e5c2b51132f9d5aef28f68738e658296
+ 3fe583177cfe50d2542b659a13039
+
+ $ keyctl pipe 46001928 > secure_key.blob
+
+3. Load the blob in the user key ring::
+
+ $ keyctl load secure kmk-master "load 'cat secure_key.blob'" @u
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -7645,6 +7645,18 @@ F: include/keys/trusted-type.h
F: security/keys/trusted.c
F: security/keys/trusted.h
+KEYS-SECURE
+M: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>
+R: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
+L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
+S: Supported
+F: include/keys/secure-type.h
+F: security/keys/secure_key.c
+F: security/keys/securekey_desc.c
+F: security/keys/securekey_desc.h
+F: security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c
+
KEYS/KEYRINGS:
M: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
@@ -5,3 +5,11 @@ config OPTEE
help
This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
driver.
+
+config OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES
+ int "Private Shared Memory Pages"
+ default 1
+ depends on OPTEE
+ help
+ This sets the number of private shared memory pages to be
+ used by OP-TEE TEE driver.
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#define DRIVER_NAME "optee"
-#define OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES 1
+#define OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES CONFIG_OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES
/**
* optee_from_msg_param() - convert from OPTEE_MSG parameters to
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/secure-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_SECURE_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_SECURE_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+/* Minimum key size to be used is 32 bytes and maximum key size fixed
+ * is 128 bytes.
+ * Blob size to be kept is Maximum key size + blob header added by CAAM.
+ */
+
+#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
+#define BLOB_HEADER_SIZE 48
+
+#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE (MAX_KEY_SIZE + BLOB_HEADER_SIZE)
+
+struct secure_key_payload {
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ unsigned int key_len;
+ unsigned int blob_len;
+ unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
+ unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_secure;
+#endif
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -71,6 +71,17 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config SECURE_KEYS
+ tristate "SECURE_KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM && CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR
+ help
+ This option provide support for creating secure-type key and blobs
+ in kernel. Secure keys are random number symmetric keys generated
+ from CAAM. The CAAM creates the blobs for the random key.
+ Userspace will only be able to see the blob.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
depends on KEYS
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -28,4 +28,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
#
obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
+CFLAGS_secure_key.o += -I$(obj)/../../drivers/crypto/caam/
+CFLAGS_securekey_desc.o += -I$(obj)/../../drivers/crypto/caam/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) += securekey.o
+securekey-y := securekey_desc.o \
+ secure_key.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
@@ -7,5 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypte
encrypted-keys-y := encrypted.o ecryptfs_format.o
masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) := masterkey_trusted.o
+masterkey-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) := masterkey_secure.o
masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS)-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) := masterkey_trusted.o
+masterkey-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS)-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) := masterkey_secure.o
encrypted-keys-y += $(masterkey-y) $(masterkey-m-m)
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "ecryptfs_format.h"
static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
+static const char KEY_SECURE_PREFIX[] = "secure:";
static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int ivsize;
static int blksize;
#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(KEY_SECURE_PREFIX) - 1)
#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
#define KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN 16
#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const cha
/*
* valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key
*
- * key-type:= "trusted:" | "user:"
+ * key-type:= "trusted:" | "user:" | "secure:"
* desc:= master-key description
*
* Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update,
@@ -140,6 +142,8 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char
if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+ else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_SECURE_PREFIX, KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN))
+ prefix_len = KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN;
else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
else
@@ -358,7 +362,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u
enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
-/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
+/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted/secure key */
static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
@@ -429,6 +433,11 @@ static struct key *request_master_key(st
mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc +
KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN,
master_key, master_keylen);
+ } else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_SECURE_PREFIX,
+ KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+ mkey = request_secure_key(epayload->master_desc +
+ KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN,
+ master_key, master_keylen);
} else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX,
KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc +
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ static inline struct key *request_truste
}
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS)
+extern struct key *request_secure_key(const char *secure_desc,
+ const u8 **master_key,
+ size_t *master_keylen);
+#else
+static inline struct key *request_secure_key(const char *secure_desc,
+ const u8 **master_key,
+ size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+#endif
+
#if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/secure-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include "encrypted.h"
+
+/*
+ * request_secure_key - request the secure key
+ *
+ * Secure keys and their blobs are derived from CAAM hardware.
+ * Userspace manages secure key-type data, but key data is not
+ * visible in plain form. It is presented as blobs.
+ */
+struct key *request_secure_key(const char *secure_desc,
+ const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct secure_key_payload *spayload;
+ struct key *skey;
+
+ skey = request_key(&key_type_secure, secure_desc, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(skey))
+ goto error;
+
+ down_read(&skey->sem);
+ spayload = skey->payload.data[0];
+ *master_key = spayload->key;
+ *master_keylen = spayload->key_len;
+error:
+ return skey;
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/secure_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2018 NXP
+ * Secure key is generated using NXP CAAM hardware block. CAAM generates the
+ * random number (used as a key) and creates its blob for the user.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <keys/secure-type.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
+
+#include "securekey_desc.h"
+
+static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+
+enum {
+ error = -1,
+ new_key,
+ load_blob,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {new_key, "new"},
+ {load_blob, "load"},
+ {error, NULL}
+};
+
+static struct secure_key_payload *secure_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct secure_key_payload *sec_key = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*sec_key));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ sec_key = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec_key), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sec_key)
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ return sec_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_inputdata - parse the keyctl input data and fill in the
+ * payload structure for key or its blob.
+ * param[in]: data pointer to the data to be parsed for creating key.
+ * param[in]: p pointer to secure key payload structure to fill parsed data
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int parse_inputdata(char *data, struct secure_key_payload *p)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ long keylen = 0;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd = -EINVAL;
+ char *c = NULL;
+
+ c = strsep(&data, " \t");
+ if (!c) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the keyctl command i.e. new_key or load_blob etc */
+ key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case new_key:
+ /* first argument is key size */
+ c = strsep(&data, " \t");
+ if (!c) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+ if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
+ keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p->key_len = keylen;
+ ret = new_key;
+
+ break;
+ case load_blob:
+ /* first argument is blob data for CAAM*/
+ c = strsep(&data, " \t");
+ if (!c) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Blob_len = No of characters in blob/2 */
+ p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+ if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = load_blob;
+
+ break;
+ case error:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secure_instantiate - create a new secure type key.
+ * Supports the operation to generate a new key. A random number
+ * is generated from CAAM as key data and the corresponding red blob
+ * is formed and stored as key_blob.
+ * Also supports the operation to load the blob and key is derived using
+ * that blob from CAAM.
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int secure_instantiate(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct secure_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ char *data = NULL;
+ int key_cmd = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ enum sk_req_type sk_op_type;
+ struct device *dev = NULL;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
+ data[datalen] = '\0';
+
+ payload = secure_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!payload) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate caam job ring for operation to be performed from CAAM */
+ dev = caam_jr_alloc();
+ if (!dev) {
+ pr_info("caam_jr_alloc failed\n");
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_cmd = parse_inputdata(data, payload);
+ if (key_cmd < 0) {
+ ret = key_cmd;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case load_blob:
+ /*
+ * Red blob decryption to be done for load operation
+ * to derive the key.
+ */
+ sk_op_type = sk_red_blob_dec;
+ ret = key_deblob(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ pr_info("secure_key: key_blob decap fail (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case new_key:
+ /* Get Random number from caam of the specified length */
+ sk_op_type = sk_get_random;
+ ret = caam_get_random(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ pr_info("secure_key: get_random fail (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate red blob of key random bytes with CAAM */
+ sk_op_type = sk_red_blob_enc;
+ ret = key_blob(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ pr_info("secure_key: key_blob encap fail (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ if (data)
+ kzfree(data);
+ if (dev)
+ caam_jr_free(dev);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+ else
+ kzfree(payload);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secure_read - copy the blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * param[in]: key pointer to key struct
+ * param[in]: buffer pointer to user data for creating key
+ * param[in]: buflen is the length of the buffer
+ * On success, return to userspace the secure key data size.
+ */
+static long secure_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ const struct secure_key_payload *p = NULL;
+ char *ascii_buf;
+ char *bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ p = dereference_key_locked(key);
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+ ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bufp = ascii_buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ }
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secure_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+static void secure_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_secure = {
+ .name = "secure",
+ .instantiate = secure_instantiate,
+ .destroy = secure_destroy,
+ .read = secure_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_secure);
+
+static void secure_shash_release(void)
+{
+ if (hashalg)
+ crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
+ if (hmacalg)
+ crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+}
+
+static int __init secure_shash_alloc(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
+ pr_info("secure_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ hmac_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
+ }
+
+ hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
+ pr_info("secure_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ hash_alg);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
+ goto hashalg_fail;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+hashalg_fail:
+ crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init init_secure_key(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = secure_shash_alloc();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_secure);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ secure_shash_release();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_secure_key(void)
+{
+ secure_shash_release();
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_secure);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_secure_key);
+module_exit(cleanup_secure_key);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/securekey_desc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <keys/secure-type.h>
+#include "securekey_desc.h"
+
+/* key modifier for blob encapsulation & decapsulation descriptor */
+u8 key_modifier[] = "SECURE_KEY";
+u32 key_modifier_len = 10;
+
+void caam_sk_rng_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+ struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data = NULL;
+ struct random_desc *rnd_desc = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
+
+ init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+ fetch_rnd_data = &skreq->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+ rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
+ len = fetch_rnd_data->key_len;
+
+ /* command 0x82500000 */
+ append_cmd(desc, CMD_OPERATION | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG |
+ OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG);
+ /* command 0x60340000 | len */
+ append_cmd(desc, CMD_FIFO_STORE | FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE | len);
+ append_ptr(desc, rnd_desc->rnd_data);
+}
+
+void caam_sk_redblob_encap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+ struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc =
+ &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
+ struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_req =
+ &skreq->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
+ u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
+
+ init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+ /* Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
+ append_key_as_imm(desc, key_modifier, key_modifier_len,
+ key_modifier_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+
+ /* SEQ IN PTR Command. */
+ append_seq_in_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->in_data, red_blob_req->data_sz,
+ 0);
+
+ /* SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
+ append_seq_out_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+ red_blob_req->redblob_sz, 0);
+
+ /* RedBlob encapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
+ append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_ENCAP_PROTOCOL | OP_PCLID_BLOB);
+}
+
+/* void caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief CAAM Descriptor creator from redblob to plaindata.
+ * param[in] skreq Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ */
+void caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+ struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc =
+ &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
+ struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_req =
+ &skreq->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
+ u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
+
+ init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+ /* Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
+ append_key_as_imm(desc, key_modifier, key_modifier_len,
+ key_modifier_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+
+ /* SEQ IN PTR Command. */
+ append_seq_in_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+ red_blob_req->redblob_sz, 0);
+
+ /* SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
+ append_seq_out_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->out_data,
+ red_blob_req->data_sz, 0);
+
+ /* RedBlob decapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
+ append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL | OP_PCLID_BLOB);
+}
+
+/* int caam_sk_get_random_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ * struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_sk_get_random_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+ struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data;
+ struct random_desc *rnd_desc;
+
+ fetch_rnd_data = &req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+ rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
+
+ rnd_desc->rnd_data = dma_map_single(dev, fetch_rnd_data->data,
+ fetch_rnd_data->key_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+ if (dma_mapping_error(dev, rnd_desc->rnd_data)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+ goto sk_random_map_fail;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+sk_random_map_fail:
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* int caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ * struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+ struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_encap;
+ struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+ red_blob_encap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
+ red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
+
+ red_blob_desc->in_data = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_encap->data,
+ red_blob_encap->data_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+ goto sk_data_fail;
+ }
+
+ red_blob_desc->redblob = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_encap->redblob,
+ red_blob_encap->redblob_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+ goto sk_redblob_fail;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+sk_redblob_fail:
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data, red_blob_encap->data_sz,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+sk_data_fail:
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* static int caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(struct device *dev,
+ * struct sk_req *req,
+ * struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+ struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_decap;
+ struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+ red_blob_decap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
+ red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
+
+ red_blob_desc->redblob = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_decap->redblob,
+ red_blob_decap->redblob_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+ goto sk_redblob_fail;
+ }
+
+ red_blob_desc->out_data = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_decap->data,
+ red_blob_decap->data_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->out_data)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+ goto sk_data_fail;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+sk_data_fail:
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+ red_blob_decap->redblob_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+sk_redblob_fail:
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* @fn void securekey_unmap(struct device *dev,
+ * struct sk_desc *skdesc, struct sk_req *req)
+ * @brief DMA unmap the buffer pointers.
+ * @param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * @param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * @param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ */
+void securekey_unmap(struct device *dev,
+ struct sk_desc *skdesc, struct sk_req *req)
+{
+
+ switch (req->type) {
+ case sk_get_random:
+ {
+ struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data;
+ struct random_desc *rnd_desc;
+
+ fetch_rnd_data = &req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+ rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
+
+ /* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, rnd_desc->rnd_data,
+ fetch_rnd_data->key_len,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ break;
+ }
+ case sk_red_blob_enc:
+ {
+ struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_encap;
+ struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+ red_blob_encap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
+ red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
+
+ /* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data,
+ red_blob_encap->data_sz,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+ red_blob_encap->redblob_sz,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+ break;
+ }
+ case sk_red_blob_dec:
+ {
+ struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_decap;
+ struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+ red_blob_decap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
+ red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
+
+ /* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+ red_blob_decap->redblob_sz,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->out_data,
+ red_blob_decap->data_sz,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ dev_err(dev, "Unable to find request type\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ kfree(skdesc);
+}
+
+/* int caam_securekey_desc_init(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req)
+ * brief CAAM Descriptor creator for secure key operations.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_securekey_desc_init(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req)
+{
+ struct sk_desc *skdesc = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (req->type) {
+ case sk_get_random:
+ {
+ skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
+ if (!skdesc) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdesc->req_type = req->type;
+
+ if (caam_sk_get_random_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "caam get_random map fail\n");
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ caam_sk_rng_desc(req, skdesc);
+ break;
+ }
+ case sk_red_blob_enc:
+ {
+ skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
+ if (!skdesc) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ skdesc->req_type = req->type;
+
+ if (caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "caam redblob_encap map fail\n");
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Descriptor function to create redblob from data. */
+ caam_sk_redblob_encap_desc(req, skdesc);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case sk_red_blob_dec:
+ {
+ skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
+ if (!skdesc) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ skdesc->req_type = req->type;
+
+ if (caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "caam redblob_decap map fail\n");
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Descriptor function to decap data from redblob. */
+ caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(req, skdesc);
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ pr_debug("Unknown request type\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ req->desc_pointer = (void *)skdesc;
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* static void caam_op_done (struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 ret,
+ * void *context)
+ * brief callback function to be called when descriptor executed.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to device structure
+ * param[in] desc descriptor pointer
+ * param[in] ret return status of Job submitted
+ * param[in] context void pointer
+ */
+static void caam_op_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 ret,
+ void *context)
+{
+ struct sk_req *req = context;
+
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(dev, "caam op done err: %x\n", ret);
+ /* print the error source name. */
+ caam_jr_strstatus(dev, ret);
+ }
+ /* Call securekey_unmap function for unmapping the buffer pointers. */
+ securekey_unmap(dev, req->desc_pointer, req);
+
+ req->ret = ret;
+ complete(&req->comp);
+}
+
+
+/* static int sk_job_submit(struct device *jrdev, struct sk_req *req)
+ * brief Enqueue a Job descriptor to Job ring and wait until SEC returns.
+ * param[in] jrdev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+static int sk_job_submit(struct device *jrdev, struct sk_req *req)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ init_completion(&req->comp);
+
+ /* caam_jr_enqueue function for Enqueue a job descriptor */
+ ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, req->hwdesc, caam_op_done, req);
+ if (!ret)
+ wait_for_completion_interruptible(&req->comp);
+
+ ret = req->ret;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
+ * struct device *dev)
+ * Create the random number of the specified length using CAAM block
+ * param[in]: out pointer to place the random bytes
+ * param[in]: length for the random data bytes.
+ * param[in]: dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
+ */
+int caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
+ struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data = NULL;
+ struct sk_req *req = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ void *temp = NULL;
+
+ req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
+ if (!req) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ req->type = fetch_rnd;
+ fetch_rnd_data = &(req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data);
+
+ /* initialise with key length */
+ fetch_rnd_data->key_len = p->key_len;
+
+ temp = kmalloc(fetch_rnd_data->key_len, GFP_DMA);
+ if (!temp) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ fetch_rnd_data->data = temp;
+
+ ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*Copy output to key buffer. */
+ memcpy(p->key, fetch_rnd_data->data, p->key_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (req)
+ kfree(req);
+
+ if (temp)
+ kfree(temp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_get_random);
+
+/* key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type
+ * struct device *dev)
+ * Deblobify the blob to get the key data and fill in secure key payload struct
+ * param[in] p pointer to the secure key payload
+ * param[in] decap_type operation to be done.
+ * param[in] dev dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
+ */
+int key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type,
+ struct device *dev)
+{
+ unsigned int blob_len;
+ struct sk_red_blob_decap *d_blob;
+ struct sk_req *req = NULL;
+ int total_sz = 0, *temp = NULL, ret = 0;
+
+ req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
+ if (!req) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ d_blob = &(req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap);
+ blob_len = p->blob_len;
+ req->type = decap_type;
+
+ /*
+ * Red blob size is the blob_len filled in payload struct
+ * Data_sz i.e. key is the blob_len - blob header size
+ */
+
+ d_blob->redblob_sz = blob_len;
+ d_blob->data_sz = blob_len - (SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ + SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ);
+ total_sz = d_blob->data_sz + d_blob->redblob_sz;
+
+ temp = kmalloc(total_sz, GFP_DMA);
+ if (!temp) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ req->mem_pointer = temp;
+ d_blob->redblob = temp;
+ d_blob->data = d_blob->redblob + d_blob->redblob_sz;
+ memcpy(d_blob->redblob, p->blob, blob_len);
+
+ ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init: Failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*Copy output to key buffer. */
+ p->key_len = d_blob->data_sz;
+ memcpy(p->key, d_blob->data, p->key_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (temp)
+ kfree(temp);
+ if (req)
+ kfree(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_deblob);
+
+/* key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
+ * struct device *dev)
+ * To blobify the key data to get the blob. This blob can only be seen by
+ * userspace.
+ * param[in] p pointer to the secure key payload
+ * param[in] decap_type operation to be done.
+ * param[in] dev dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
+ */
+int key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
+ struct device *dev)
+{
+ unsigned int key_len;
+ struct sk_red_blob_encap *k_blob;
+ struct sk_req *req = NULL;
+ int total_sz = 0, *temp = NULL, ret = 0;
+
+ req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
+ if (!req) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_len = p->key_len;
+
+ req->type = encap_type;
+ k_blob = &(req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap);
+
+ /*
+ * Data_sz i.e. key len and the corresponding blob_len is
+ * key_len + BLOB header size.
+ */
+
+ k_blob->data_sz = key_len;
+ k_blob->redblob_sz = key_len + SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ + SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ;
+ total_sz = k_blob->data_sz + k_blob->redblob_sz;
+
+ temp = kmalloc(total_sz, GFP_DMA);
+ if (!temp) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ req->mem_pointer = temp;
+ k_blob->data = temp;
+
+ k_blob->redblob = k_blob->data + k_blob->data_sz;
+ memcpy(k_blob->data, p->key, key_len);
+
+ ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*Copy output to key buffer. */
+ p->blob_len = k_blob->redblob_sz;
+ memcpy(p->blob, k_blob->redblob, p->blob_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (temp)
+ kfree(req->mem_pointer);
+ if (req)
+ kfree(req);
+ return ret;
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_blob);
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/securekey_desc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 NXP
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef _SECUREKEY_DESC_H_
+#define _SECUREKEY_DESC_H_
+
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "regs.h"
+#include "intern.h"
+#include "desc.h"
+#include "desc_constr.h"
+#include "jr.h"
+#include "error.h"
+#include "pdb.h"
+
+#define SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ 32 /* Blob key size. */
+#define SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ 16 /* Blob MAC size. */
+
+/*
+ * brief defines different kinds of operations supported by this module.
+ */
+enum sk_req_type {
+ sk_get_random,
+ sk_red_blob_enc,
+ sk_red_blob_dec,
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * struct random_des
+ * param[out] rnd_data output buffer for random data.
+ */
+struct random_desc {
+ dma_addr_t rnd_data;
+};
+
+/* struct redblob_encap_desc
+ * details Structure containing dma address for redblob encapsulation.
+ * param[in] in_data input data to redblob encap descriptor.
+ * param[out] redblob output buffer for redblob.
+ */
+struct redblob_encap_desc {
+ dma_addr_t in_data;
+ dma_addr_t redblob;
+};
+
+/* struct redblob_decap_desc
+ * details Structure containing dma address for redblob decapsulation.
+ * param[in] redblob input buffer to redblob decap descriptor.
+ * param[out] out_data output data from redblob decap descriptor.
+ */
+struct redblob_decap_desc {
+ dma_addr_t redblob;
+ dma_addr_t out_data;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_desc
+ * details Structure for securekey descriptor creation.
+ * param[in] req_type operation supported.
+ * param[in] dma_u union of struct for supported operation.
+ */
+struct sk_desc {
+ u32 req_type;
+ union {
+ struct redblob_encap_desc redblob_encapdesc;
+ struct redblob_decap_desc redblob_decapdesc;
+ struct random_desc random_descp;
+ } dma_u;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_fetch_rnd_data
+ * decriptor structure containing key length.
+ */
+struct sk_fetch_rnd_data {
+ void *data;
+ size_t key_len;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_red_blob_encap
+ * details Structure containing buffer pointers for redblob encapsulation.
+ * param[in] data Input data.
+ * param[in] data_sz size of Input data.
+ * param[out] redblob output buffer for redblob.
+ * param[in] redblob_sz size of redblob.
+ */
+struct sk_red_blob_encap {
+ void *data;
+ uint32_t data_sz;
+ void *redblob;
+ uint32_t redblob_sz;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_red_blob_decap
+ * details Structure containing buffer pointers for redblob decapsulation.
+ * param[in] redblob Input redblob.
+ * param[in] redblob_sz size of redblob.
+ * param[out] data output buffer for data.
+ * param[in] data_sz size of output data.
+ */
+struct sk_red_blob_decap {
+ void *redblob;
+ uint32_t redblob_sz;
+ void *data;
+ uint32_t data_sz;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_req
+ * details Structure for securekey request creation.
+ * param[in] type operation supported.
+ * param[in] req_u union of struct for supported operation.
+ * param[out] ret return status of CAAM operation.
+ * param[in] mem_pointer memory pointer for allocated kernel memory.
+ * param[in] desc_pointer Pointer to securekey descriptor creation structure.
+ * param[in] comp struct completion object.
+ * param[in] hwdesc contains descriptor instructions.
+ */
+struct sk_req {
+ enum sk_req_type type;
+ void *arg;
+ union {
+ struct sk_red_blob_encap sk_red_blob_encap;
+ struct sk_red_blob_decap sk_red_blob_decap;
+ struct sk_fetch_rnd_data sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+ } req_u;
+ int ret;
+ void *mem_pointer;
+ void *desc_pointer;
+ struct completion comp;
+ u32 hwdesc[MAX_CAAM_DESCSIZE];
+};
+
+int caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
+ struct device *dev);
+int key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
+ struct device *dev);
+int key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type,
+ struct device *dev);
+
+#endif /*_SECUREKEY_DESC_H_*/
Generated by GNU Enscript 1.6.5.90.