OpenWrt – Rev 1
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From d68424b5ef92f5810760f90e9eeb664572a61e4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:49:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3: rpcclient: change the default auth
level from DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY
ncacn_ip_tcp:server should get the same protection as ncacn_np:server
if authentication and smb signing is used.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit dab41dee8a4fb27dbf3913b0e44a4cc726e3ac98)
---
source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
+++ b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
@@ -1062,10 +1062,9 @@ out_free:
}
}
if (pipe_default_auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
- /* If neither Integrity or Privacy are requested then
- * Use just Connect level */
+ /* If nothing is requested then default to integrity */
if (pipe_default_auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE) {
- pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT;
+ pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY;
}
}
--- a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+++ b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
@@ -593,15 +593,15 @@ struct composite_context *dcerpc_pipe_au
/* Perform an authenticated DCE-RPC bind
*/
- if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_SIGN|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
+ if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_CONNECT|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
/*
we are doing an authenticated connection,
- but not using sign or seal. We must force
- the CONNECT dcerpc auth type as a NONE auth
- type doesn't allow authentication
- information to be passed.
+ which needs to use [connect], [sign] or [seal].
+ If nothing is specified, we default to [sign] now.
+ This give roughly the same protection as
+ ncacn_np with smb signing.
*/
- conn->flags |= DCERPC_CONNECT;
+ conn->flags |= DCERPC_SIGN;
}
if (s->binding->flags & DCERPC_AUTH_SPNEGO) {
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<samba:parameter name="allow dcerpc auth level connect"
+ context="G"
+ type="boolean"
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+ <para>This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to
+ be used with DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication,
+ but no per message integrity nor privacy protection.</para>
+
+ <para>The behavior can be controlled per interface name (e.g. lsarpc, netlogon, samr, srvsvc,
+ winreg, wkssvc ...) by using 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = no' as option.</para>
+
+ <para>This option yields precedence to the implentation specific restrictions.
+ E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
+ While others like samr and lsarpc have a hardcoded default of <constant>no</constant>.
+ </para>
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">no</value>
+<value type="example">yes</value>
+
+</samba:parameter>
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
@@ -1821,6 +1821,7 @@ char* lp_perfcount_module(void);
void lp_set_passdb_backend(const char *backend);
void widelinks_warning(int snum);
char *lp_ncalrpc_dir(void);
+bool lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect(void);
/* The following definitions come from param/loadparm_server_role.c */
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ struct global {
bool bUseMmap;
bool bHostnameLookups;
bool bUnixExtensions;
+ bool bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect;
bool bDisableNetbios;
char * szDedicatedKeytabFile;
int iKerberosMethod;
@@ -2303,6 +2304,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
.flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
},
{
+ .label = "allow dcerpc auth level connect",
+ .type = P_BOOL,
+ .p_class = P_GLOBAL,
+ .ptr = &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect,
+ .special = NULL,
+ .enum_list = NULL,
+ .flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
+ },
+ {
.label = "use spnego",
.type = P_BOOL,
.p_class = P_GLOBAL,
@@ -5371,6 +5381,8 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
+ Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect = false; /* we don't allow this by default */
+
Globals.map_to_guest = 0; /* By Default, "Never" */
Globals.oplock_break_wait_time = 0; /* By Default, 0 msecs. */
Globals.enhanced_browsing = true;
@@ -5745,6 +5757,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_username_map_cache_
FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_check_password_script, &Globals.szCheckPasswordScript)
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect, &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect)
FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_wins_hook, &Globals.szWINSHook)
FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_homedir, &Globals.szTemplateHomedir)
FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_shell, &Globals.szTemplateShell)
--- a/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+++ b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ typedef struct pipe_rpc_fns {
uint32 context_id;
struct ndr_syntax_id syntax;
+ /*
+ * shall we allow "connect" auth level for this interface ?
+ */
+ bool allow_connect;
} PIPE_RPC_FNS;
/*
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@
#include "rpc_server/srv_pipe.h"
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
#include "../librpc/ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_epmapper.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_echo.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
@@ -340,6 +345,8 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
uint32 context_id)
{
struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns;
+ const char *interface_name = NULL;
+ bool ok;
DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
@@ -390,12 +397,57 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
return False;
}
+ interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+ abstract);
+
+ SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
+
context_fns->next = context_fns->prev = NULL;
context_fns->n_cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_num_cmds(abstract);
context_fns->cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_cmds(abstract);
context_fns->context_id = context_id;
context_fns->syntax = *abstract;
+ context_fns->allow_connect = lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect();
+ /*
+ * for the samr and the lsarpc interfaces we don't allow "connect"
+ * auth_level by default.
+ */
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id);
+ if (ok) {
+ context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ }
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id);
+ if (ok) {
+ context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ }
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id);
+ if (ok) {
+ context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ }
+ /*
+ * for the epmapper and echo interfaces we allow "connect"
+ * auth_level by default.
+ */
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_epmapper.syntax_id);
+ if (ok) {
+ context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+ }
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_rpcecho.syntax_id);
+ if (ok) {
+ context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+ }
+ /*
+ * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
+ * using a parametric option like:
+ * allow dcerpc auth level connect:<interface>
+ * e.g.
+ * allow dcerpc auth level connect:samr = yes
+ */
+ context_fns->allow_connect = lp_parm_bool(-1,
+ "allow dcerpc auth level connect",
+ interface_name, context_fns->allow_connect);
+
/* add to the list of open contexts */
DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns );
@@ -1736,6 +1788,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipe
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
bool ret = False;
PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns;
+ const char *interface_name = NULL;
if (!p->pipe_bound) {
DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not bound!\n"));
@@ -1757,8 +1810,36 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipe
return false;
}
+ interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+ &pipe_fns->syntax);
+
+ SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
+
DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n",
- get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &pipe_fns->syntax)));
+ interface_name));
+
+ switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!pipe_fns->allow_connect) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("%s: restrict auth_level_connect access "
+ "to [%s] with auth[type=0x%x,level=0x%x] "
+ "on [%s] from [%s]\n",
+ __func__, interface_name,
+ p->auth.auth_type,
+ p->auth.auth_level,
+ derpc_transport_string_by_transport(p->transport),
+ p->client_id->name));
+
+ setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED));
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return true;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
if (!srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer(p, pkt, pipe_fns)) {
DEBUG(1, ("srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer: failed\n"));
--- a/source3/selftest/knownfail
+++ b/source3/selftest/knownfail
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ samba3.posix_s3.nbt.dgram.*netlogon2
samba3.*rap.sam.*.useradd # Not provided by Samba 3
samba3.*rap.sam.*.userdelete # Not provided by Samba 3
samba3.*rap.basic.*.netsessiongetinfo # Not provided by Samba 3
+samba3.blackbox.rpcclient.over.ncacn_np.with.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
+samba3.posix_s3.rpc.lsa.lookupsids.*ncacn_ip_tcp.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ if sub.returncode == 0:
plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
elif t == "raw.samba3posixtimedlock":
plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD --option=torture:localdir=$SELFTEST_PREFIX/dc/share')
+ elif t == "rpc.samr.passwords.validate":
+ plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", 'ncacn_np:$SERVER_IP[seal] -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_np ')
else:
plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
@@ -6628,6 +6628,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ValidatePassword(struct p
struct samr_GetDomPwInfo pw;
struct samr_PwInfo dom_pw_info;
+ if (p->auth.auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+ p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
if (r->in.level < 1 || r->in.level > 3) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
}