nexmon – Blame information for rev 1

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Rev Author Line No. Line
1 office 1 MDK3 TODO List
2  
3 * Write complete docs
4 * Update manpage
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6 802.11 allows you to fragment each packet into as many as 16 pieces. It would be nice if we could use fragmentated packets in every attack.
7 if you want to make the WIDS vendors hate you, also match the sequence numbers of the victims
8 * Done for TKIP QoS reinjection
9 * NOT done for deauth
10 * NOT done for eapol Logoff
11 Ad-hoc compatibility?
12 * Works for Probing
13 * Deauth should work (untested)
14 * AuthDos untested (does this even work?)
15 -> do STA flooding instead
16 Intelligent AuthDOS with Shared Key Auth
17 SSID Bruteforce: Read Wordlist from stdin
18 CTS control frame flooding
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20 * Fuzzing mode modifying incoming packets or creating random ones
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22 * Beacon Flooding should also have an options to send probe requests and responses (unicast + broadcast probes) to annoy IDS ;)
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24 * Match Sequence Numbers for all attacks that impersonate somebody (like, almost all attacks do) for MAXIMUM WIDS PAIN!
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26 EAP attacks:
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28 802.1X EAP-Failure
29 Observing a valid 802.1X EAP exchange, and then sending the station a forged EAP-Failure message.
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31 802.1X EAP-of-Death
32 Sending a malformed 802.1X EAP Identity response known to cause some APs to crash.
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34 802.1X EAP Length Attacks
35 Sending EAP type-specific messages with bad length fields to try to crash an AP or RADIUS server.
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37 Above table was taken from
38 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/general/0,295582,sid14_gci1167611,00.html?track=wsland